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CIRM'S CONSOLIDATED IP POLICY: WILL IT
PROMOTE COLLABORATION?
James Langston*
I. INTRODUCTION

Dr. Shinya Yamanaka, a medical doctor with a Ph.D. in
Pharmacology, revolutionized stem cell research three years
ago,' by demonstrating that he could transform ordinary cells
derived from skin cells into stem cells.2 At his urging, a stem
cell research company, called iPierian, was formed in July,
2009 in South San Francisco, California.'
Before the formation of iPierian, another stem cell
research company, formerly known as iZumi Bio, had
intended to co-apply with the Parkinson's Institute of
Sunnyvale for a grant from the California Institute for
Regenerative Medicine ("CIRM") to conduct stem cell
research.' At the last minute, iZumi became uncertain as to
whether the use of CIRM funds would render it subject to
CIRM's intellectual property ("IP") policies and declined to
* Comment Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 51; J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; M.B.A Candidate, Leavey School of
Business. I would like to thank the members of the Board of Editors for their
helpful comments and their patience.
1. See Sabin Russell, Scientist Is Crucial to the Bay Area's Role in Stem
Cell Research, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at A33A (explaining how the cells Dr.
Yamanaka derived basically do away with the political and ethical baggage of
working with stem cells); see also Press Release, iPierian, iZumi Bio and Pierian
Merge to Form iPierian to Advance Cellular Reprogramming (Jul. 8, 2009),
("[His]
available at http://www.ipierian.com/news-events/press-releases/?i=93
lab first succeeded in inducing iPS cells in mouse.").
2. Russell, supra note 1, at A33A ("Dr. Yamanaka's insight was to find a
way to reprogram ordinary cells by sprinkling them with genes that act like
switches.").
3. See Press Release, iPierian, supra note 1 (describing the purposes of
iPierian's research using induced pluripotent stem cells).
4. See Russell, supra note 1, at A33A.
5. Interview with Bill Langston, Chief Executive Officer, The Parkinson's
Institute, in Los Altos. Cal. (Dec. 23, 2009).
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apply as co-author, nearly derailing the grant and forfeiting
the potential benefits of the intended research.' This chain of
events illustrates the so-called chilling effect. Access and
revenue sharing requirements in CIRM's IP policy acted as a
deterrent to iZumi, frustrating collaboration and chilling the
commercialization of therapies derived from stem cell
research.'
On November 2, 2004, California voters approved a
statewide ballot measure that called for the establishment of
a new State agency to make grants and provide loans for stem
cell research, research facilities, and other vital research
opportunities.' In addition to providing three billion dollars
in funding for stem cell research over ten years, Proposition
71 established the California Institute for Regenerative
Medicine.' In California, CIRM distributes State funding for
stem cell research.'o One of the intents of Proposition 71, as
stated in section 3, was to "[blenefit the California economy
by creating projects, jobs, and therapies that will generate
millions of dollars in new tax revenues in our state."" These
goals have become more pressing in light of the nearly $25
billion budget deficit in California,12 and a statewide
unemployment rate that is in excess of twelve percent. 3
To facilitate the accomplishment of these goals, CIRM's
IP policy requires grantees to provide access to developed
6. Id.
Herder, Asking for Money Back-Chilling
Matthew
7. See
Commercialization or Recouping Public Trust in the Context of Stem Cell
Research?, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 203, 224-31 (2008).
8. OFFICE OF ADMIN. LAW, NOTICE OF PROPOSED REGULATION ADOPTION
AND REPEAL, CAL. CODE REGS., TIT. 17-PUBLIC HEALTH, DIVISION 4-CAL.
INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., CHAPTER 6 (2008).

9. Id. "[T]he California initiative, which has already disbursed millions in
grants, remains an important source of both funds and policy guidance for this
research." Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: ConsiderationBased Regulation in Patent Law, 58 EMORY L. J. 889, 933 (2009).
10. Frequently Asked Questions about CIRM, CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE
MED., http://www.cirm.ca.gov/AboutCIRMFAQ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
11. Proposition 71-Cal. Stem Cell Research and Cures Initiative, 2004 Cal.
Legis. Serv. Prop. 71 (West) (enacted).
12. See Cathleen Decker, Poll: Californians Want It Both Ways on Budget,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/lame-poll-20101118,0,1496673.story.
13. See Alana Semuels, California's Unemployment Third-Highest
PM),
12:40
2010,
21,
(Sept.
TIMES
Nation, L.A.
the
in
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money-co/2010/09/californias-unemploymentthird-highest-in-the-nation.html.
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drugs," and requires grantees to share a portion of their
revenues with the State. 5 The access provision is essentially
a form of control on pricing that makes the product affordable
to a wider segment of the population while reducing private
profit.1 6 Revenue sharing is a way to ensure that taxpayers
receive a direct return on their investment. 7 The State
receives a certain percentage of profits realized on the public's
behalf, and thus the taxpayers recoup a portion of their
investment." The downside for private companies is that
both access and revenue sharing requirements cut into their
profits. Many businesses, like iZumi, are thinking twice
about applying for grants from CIRM.'e In fact, the effect of
the access and revenue sharing provisions on participation by
for-profits may be hampering CIRM's ability to achieve its
goals.
CIRM encourages collaboration between for-profits and
non-profits because it sees collaboration as the best way to
effectuate translation of stem cell therapies to clinical cures.2 0
When technology is generated in universities, a common
translation path is to license the technology to biotech
companies that typically develop the technology further and
then license it to pharmaceutical companies. 2 CIRM's former
IP policy, however, acted as a barrier to collaboration.
Grants awarded prior to December 17, 2009 were subject
14. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100607 (2009).
15. § 100608.
16. See Herder, supra note 7, at 204.
17. Id. at 204-05.
18. Id.
19. See Businesses Give Mixed Response to CIRM Overtures,
CAL.
STEM
CELL
REP.
(Dec.
21,
2007,
09:17
PST),
http://californiastemcellreport.blogspot.com/2007/12/business-give-mixedresponse-to-cirm.html.
20. RFA 09-01: CIRM Disease Team Research Awards, CAL. INST. FOR
REGENERATIVE MED., http://www.cirm.ca.gov/cirm-rfa/rfa-09-01-cirm-diseaseteam-research-awards (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) (defining "translation" as the
necessary research and regulatory activities to prepare, file, and complete new
drug applications with the Food and Drug Administration). Preclinical data
suggests that many stem cell therapies are ready for translation to a clinical
cure. Id.
21. See Edward E. Penhoet, ITPF Comm. Chair, Cal. Inst. for Regenerative
Med., Remarks at the Regular Meeting of the Indep. Citizens' Oversight Comm.
(Aug. 20, 2009), available at http://www.cirm.ca.gov/files/transcripts/pdfl2009/820-09.pdf; see also CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note 20
(explaining the inherent multidisciplinary process combining the strength of
industry and the nonprofit sector).
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to CIRM's old IP policy.2 2 Under that policy, grantees were
subject to two different IP policies with disparate revenue
sharing requirements for non-profit and for-profit grantees.2 3
Those policies have now been consolidated into a single policy
for both types of applicants. The intended effects of the
consolidation are four-fold,2 4 but the main concern of this
comment is whether these effects allay the purported chilling
effect of access and revenue sharing policies on the
commercialization of scientific discoveries, and thus further
the economic objectives of CIRM.
Part II of this comment examines the genesis of CIRM,
the former IP policies, the breakdown of grantees under that
policy, and the reasons for CIRM's new consolidated IP
Part III identifies the shortcomings of this new
policy.
policy.26 Part IV analyzes the effects of consolidation on the
scope of CIRM's IP policy, the chilling effect of consolidation
on the marketplace for therapies derived from CIRM-Funded
Research, and the clarifications made by the consolidated IP
policy.27 Part V proposes that the ICOC develop a bifurcated
policy, with a modified revenue sharing policy specific to
"disease teams."28 Finally, Part VI concludes that such a
policy would increase participation of commercial enterprises
and thereby achieve CIRM's goals.2 9
22. Adopted CIRM Stem Cell Grant Regulations, CAL. INST. FOR
REGENERATIVE MED., http://www.cirm.ca.gov/cirm-operations/Regulations (last
visited Nov. 11, 2010).

23. Compare CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 100300-100310 (2009), with §§
100401-100410 (describing intellectual property requirements for non-profits
and for-profits, respectively).
24. See Memorandum from C. Scott Tocher, Counsel to the
Chair, to Members of the Indep. Citizens' Oversight Comm., Cal. Inst.
at
available
13,
2009),
(Oct.
Med.
for
Regenerative
http://www.cirm.ca.gov/files/meetings/pdf/2009/101609_item-3-memo.pdf ("The
consolidation regulations do essentially four things: 1) consolidate and
harmonize the two existing sets of regulations to eliminate the potential for
unintended differences in application; 2) clarify the reach of the IP regulations
to better illuminate what happens when non-grantee/licensees use or benefit
from CIRM-funded intellectual property; 3) clarify how the regulations will
operate in collaborative research environments consisting of multiple for- and
non-profit organizations; and 4) improve existing language or concepts to
address inadvertent ambiguities and omissions in the existing language.").
25. See discussion infra Part II.
26. See discussion infra Part III.
27. See discussion infra Part IV.
28. See discussion infra Part V.
29. See discussion infra Part VI.
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II. BACKGROUND OF CIRM AND ITS IP POLICY

A. The Genesis of CIRM
By the end of August 2001, the Bush administration had
prohibited all federally funded human embryonic stem cell
research, except research that used stem cell lines created
prior to August 9, 2001.0 In response, a group of Californians
came together to support a State-funded stem cell research
initiative, which ultimately lead to the passage of Proposition
71.31 Proposition 71, titled the California Stem Cell Research
and Cures Initiative, created CIRM in 2004.32 The mission of
CIRM
is to foster and promote stem cell research with the aim of
A secondary goal is to
improving human health.
strengthen California's biotechnology industry and create
collateral economic benefits such as high-paying jobs and
increased tax revenues. CIRM believes that the funding of
commercial research organizations focused on stem cellrelated projects is a key component to achieving [these
goals]. Increased interest by the commercial research
sector in stem cell-related research projects and the
successful translation of basic research discoveries into
commercial products for public use are primary success
indicators (among others) that can be used by CIRM to
track benefits of commercial sector funding.3 3
Proposition 71 has the potential to generate significant
Four economic studies
economic benefit to California.
estimated the potential economic benefits of Proposition 71,
and each of the researchers agreed that the greatest financial
return to the State would result from improved therapies and
They also agreed that the
reduced health care costs. 34
30. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Embryonic Stem
2001), available at http://georgewbush(Aug. 9,
Research
Cell
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-1.html.
31. President Obama recently lifted certain restrictions on federal funding
for human embryonic stem cell research. Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg.
10,667 (Mar. 9, 2009).
32. OFFICE OF ADMIN. LAW, supra note 8, at 1.
33. Id. at 2. Translation is the process whereby basic research is ultimately
converted into clinical cures. See Press Release, Cal. Inst. for Regenerative
Med., CIRM Awards $67 Million to Move Basic Research Toward the Clinic
(Apr. 29, 2009), availableat httpi//www.cirm.ca.gov/PressRelease_042809.
34. California Bill Analysis, Hearing Before the S. Appropriations Comm.
On S.B. 771, 2007-2008 Leg. 2 (Cal. 2007).
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potential economic and tax benefits to the State from stem
cell investment would reach several billion dollars annually.35
CIRM's IP policies were influenced by the Bayh-Dole Act
("Bayh-Dole")," which governs federal grants issued by the
Bayh-Dole
National Institutes of Health ("NIH").
represents the culmination of two patent reform bills that
were under consideration in the House and Senate in late
1980. Both bills contained recoupment mechanisms.39 In
particular, language in the Senate's version of the bill
resembled what are now CIRM's for-profit revenue sharing
provisions.4 0 Although both S. 414 and H.R. 6933 were
passed by significant majorities, neither payback provision
was retained.4 1 Concerns about private actors appropriating
the lion's share of profit derived from publicly funded
inventions therefore persisted.4 2
In 2000, a new recoupment mechanism was proposed by
Senator Wyden (D-Or.) that would have provided a financial
Blockbuster drugs are
return on blockbuster drugs."
pharmaceuticals that generate greater than $500 million in
annual revenue.4 4 Ultimately, Wyden's proposal was not
35. Id. ("The four studies projected royalty/revenues to the state of between
$160 million and $1.1 billion or a return of between .6% and 4.5%. By
comparison, licensing income averaged about 2.5% of research expenditures on
an annual basis among universities, but licensing in hospitals and research
institutes was 7.9%. Universities and nonprofit companies in California spent
$6.9 billion on R&D in 2003. CIRM's investment of $300 million annually
represents about five percent of annual R&D expenditures at California basic
research institutions.").

36. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006).
37. See, e.g., David C. Tolley, Regulatory Priorities Governing Stem Cell
Research in California: Relaxing Revenue Sharing & Safeguarding Access
Plans, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 219, 223-26 (2008).
38. Herder, supra note 7, at 207-12.
39. Id. at 207.
40. Section 204 of Senate Bill 414 had two payback provisions: first, section
204(a) obligated the grantee to pay a 15% share of gross licensing revenues once
they surpassed a $70,000 per year threshold; second, section 204(b) obligated
the grantee to pay a share, not to exceed 5%, of sales from products generating
greater than $1,000,000 in gross income. S. 414, 96th Cong. § 204 (1980)
(enacted). See also Herder, supra note 7, at 207-08.
41. Herder, supra note 7, at 211 ("[Tlhis was the combined result of the
political climate at the time-the U.S. was widely believed to be falling behind
its global competitors and the legislation was seen as instrumental to reversing
that trend-and the shrewd work of one key bureaucrat, Norman Latker.").
42. See id. at 203-07.
43. Id. at 212.
44. Id.
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adopted for three reasons:45 first, NIH faced a general
tracking problem; 6 second, several studies suggested that the
rate of indirect return from federally funded research was
already phenomenal;4 7 and third, there was strong opposition
from several of the groups who were concerned that any
movement to extract a direct financial return for the
investment would dampen, if not destroy, the industry's
willingness to establish agreements with academic
institutions.4 8 Indeed, this final concern has manifested itself
in the effects of CIRM's revenue sharing provisions. *
B. CIRM's Former IP Policy
Although CIRM does not fund research with the aim of
making a profit, benefitting California economically is one of
the objectives stated in Proposition 71.5 To that end, CIRM's
IP provisions included revenue sharing requirements despite
The
the objections of several scientific advisors."'
Independent Citizens' Oversight Committee ("ICOC")board 5 2-is
governing
twenty-nine-member
CIRM's
45. Some critics of CIRM's revenue sharing policy cite its two-time rejection
at the federal level as an argument against the policy. See, e.g., Tolley, supra
note 37, at 236-37.
46. See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, A
PLAN TO ENSURE TAXPAYERS' INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED § A (July 2001),
available at http://www.nih.gov/news/070101wyden.htm ("NIH encountered
difficulty in being able to cross-reference NIH grants and contracts that gave
rise to inventions with any patents or licenses covering the final product, as well
as an inability to identify other federal and/or non-federal sources of funds that
contribute to an inventive technology."). The reason for this difficulty was that
investigators were not required to provide such information to the funding
agency, so tracking had to be done manually, on a case-by-case basis. Id. § D-1.
47. See id. § C-7 ("[Tihe National Science Foundation estimates that the
rate of return on the Government's investment for basic research can be as high
as 40 percent . . . .").

48. See id. § D-1 ("NIH explored the notion of possible royalty redirection for
'blockbuster' drugs under licenses arising from the Bayh-Dole Act. This
suggestion was met with strong resistance from the academic community
because it was perceived as a tax that would, at best, have no net effect on the
price of a therapeutic drug and, at worst, increase its cost. Further, it was
argued that such redirection of royalties would undermine the research
enterprise, drain funds for academic development, and discourage faculty
members from embarking in the technology transfer process.").
49. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
50. Proposition 71, supra note 11, at 3.
51. This was done largely as a concession to political interests demanding a
return on investment for public money. Lee, supra note 9, at 934.
52. OFFICE OF ADMIN. LAw, supra note 8, at 1 ("The ICOC members are
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responsible for establishing policies regarding IP rights
arising from research funded by CIRM."
The ICOC, in its effort to ensure economic benefit to the
State, approved disparate IP policies, the application of which
turned largely on whether the entity was commercial or not.54
Unlike NIH's policy, CIRM's policy gives the State a financial
stake in products derived from CIRM-Funded Research."
CIRM's policies take a more aggressive approach to realizing
tangible economic benefits for the State and ensuring that
those benefits will reach Californians."
CIRM's revenue sharing provision for non-profits,
applicable to grants made before December 17, 2009, is set
forth in section 100308." Nonprofits are defined either as: 1)
institutions of higher education or other organizations exempt
from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code; or 2) any
other non-profit scientific or educational organization
qualified under a state non-profit organizational charter."
Non-profit grantees are required to share revenues with the
State of California that result from licensing of CIRM funded

public officials, appointed on the basis of their experience earned in California's
leading public universities, non-profit academic and research institutions,
patient advocacy groups and the biotechnology industry."). See also CAL. INST.
FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note 10.
53. These guidelines are then adopted by the ICOC in the form of interim or
final regulations. CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note 10.
54. See Memorandum from C. Scott Tocher to Members of the Indep.
Citizens' Oversight Comm., supra note 24 ("The ICOC first approved an
intellectual property policy for non-profit and academic research institutions, as
those institutions were the first recipients of CIRM grants. That policy, initially
adopted in February of 2006, completed the formal regulatory adoption process
and went into effect in 2007. The formal adoption of regulations governing forprofit institutions began during the development of the non-profit policy and
concluded in early 2008.").
55. Subsection 125290.30(h) of the California Health and Safety Code does
not codify the details of this obligation; instead, it reads:
The ICOC shall establish standards that require that all grants and
loan awards be subject to intellectual property agreements that balance
the opportunity of the State of California to benefit from the patents,
royalties, and licenses that result from basic research, therapy
development, and clinical trials with the need to assure that essential
medical research is not unreasonably hindered by the intellectual
property agreements.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125290.30(h) (West 2009).
56. Tolley, supra note 37, at 225-26.
57. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100308 (2009).
58. § 100301(s).
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inventions;" specifically, twenty-five percent of net exclusive
licensing revenue in excess of $500,000 must be shared with
California."o
For-profit organizations are defined as legal entities that
are organized for the profit or benefit of their shareholders.'
The for-profit revenue sharing provision, applicable to grants
made before December 17, 2009, is set forth in section
100408, and differentiates between two types of for-profit
grantees. 6 2 First, the regulations address for-profit grantees
that receive revenue under a license agreement." These
grantees share twenty-five percent of net licensing revenue in
excess of $500,000 with the State of California.6 4
Next, the regulations address for-profit grantees that
choose to self-commercialize a product developed through
CIRM-Funded Research.
These grantees are subject to a
First, such a
four-tiered revenue sharing arrangement."
company must share a negotiated percentage of net
commercial revenues with the State (between two and five
percent), up to a maximum of three times the amount of the
original CIRM grant." Second, when the company's revenue
from a product developed through CIRM funding exceeds
$250 million in one year, the for-profit must make a
"blockbuster" payment to California of three times the initial
grant amount." Third, when revenue exceeds $500 million in
one year, the for-profit grantee must make a second
"blockbuster" payment to California.6 ' Finally, the grantee
must pay one percent of all net commercial revenue in excess
of $500 million per year to the State for the life of the
patent.o
As an example, imagine a for-profit company obtained a
$10 million grant from CIRM before December 17, 2009 and
developed a patented product that generated $5 billion in
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See § 100308(b).
Id.
§ 100401(g).
§ 100408.
See CAL. CODE REG. tit. 17 § 100408(a) (West 2009).
§ 100408(a)(1).
§ 100408(b).
See id.
§ 100408(b)(1).
§ 100408(b)(2).
CAL. CODE REG. tit. 17 § 100408(b)(2) (West 2009).
§ 100408(b)(3).
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revenue during the life of the patent.7 ' The company would
be obligated to pay to CIRM between two and five percent of
revenue for any years in which net revenue is more than
$500,000 but less than $250 million, up to $30 million in total
payments.7 2 If and when net revenue from the product
reached $250 million, the company would owe CIRM an
additional $30 million;73 and if the product produced $500
million in revenue in one year, the company would owe CIRM
another $30 million." After this second blockbuster payment,
the company would be obliged to pay one percent of net
revenue in excess of $500 million for the life of the patent.
The State would thus recover approximately $135 million
from one blockbuster product.
In addition to the revenue sharing provisions, access plan
requirements set forth in section 100407(a) also require a forprofit grantee (or its exclusive licensee) to submit a plan to
afford uninsured Californians "access" to the drug.
Subsection (b) requires for-profit grantees to provide the drug
under the Program.7 ' Finally, under subsection (c), grantees
cannot charge more for the drug than "any benchmark price,"
as defined in the Program, for purchases of the drug under
the Program that are made with Californian public funds."
C. ParticipationUnder CIRM's FormerIP Policy
Under the former IP policy, CIRM saw robust
By comparison for-profit
participation from non-profits.
participation under the former policy was weak." In this
section, the reasons for these differing levels of participation
are considered.
71. Michael Longaker et al., Proposition 71 and CIRM-Assessing the
Return on Investment, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 513, 520 (2007).
72. See
73. See

§ 100408(b)(1).
§ 100408(b)(2).

74. See id.
75. See § 100408(b)(3).
76. Longaker, supra note 71, at 520 (explaining the breakdown of $30
million in early stage revenue sharing, plus $60 million in blockbuster
payments, plus another (possible) $45 million in late stage revenue sharing).
77.
78.
79.

§ 100407(a).
§ 100407(b).
§ 100407(c).

80. See generally List of CIRM Funded Institutions, CAL. INST. FOR
REGENERATIVE MED., http://www.cirm.ca.gov/InstitutionList (last visited Nov.
11, 2010).
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Non-profit participation in CIRM funding prior to
consolidation of the IP policy was excellent." This conclusion
is borne out by the success that CIRM has had in doling out
research money in the form of its early grants exclusive to
non-profits.8 2 In its first six rounds of funding alone, CIRM
On
awarded $533,122,218 to non-profit institutions.8 3
February 16, 2007, the ICOC approved seventy-two grants
totaling approximately $45 million to researchers at twenty
academic and non-profit research centers to bring new ideas
and new investigators into the field of human embryonic stem
cell research.84 On March 16, 2007, the ICOC authorized
another $75.7 million for academic and non-profit researchers
to support mature, ongoing studies on human embryonic stem
cells by scientists with a record of accomplishment in the
field."
The total amounts awarded to non-profit academic and
research institutions prior to IP consolidation were
enormous.16 CIRM gave $162,979,744 to Stanford University,
which had received a total of forty-two monetary awards (not
exclusively for research) and the highest total dollar amount
of any institution. The next six highest amounts belonged to
the University of California campuses, the highest being
UCLA, which received $117,204,702."

This success is likely

due to the fact that basic research, not revenue, is the
primary interest of non-profits.
The number of grants awarded to private companies
pales in comparison to that of non-profit academic and
research institutions." For example, the first request for
81. See generally CIRM Rounds of Funding, CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE
MED., http://www.cirm.ca.gov/GrantsSummary (last visited Nov, 11, 2010).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. Press Release, Cal. Inst. for Regenerative Med., $45 Million Headed
for Stem Cell Research in California (Feb. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.cirm.ca.gov/PressRelease_- 021607.
85. Press Release, Cal. Inst. for Regenerative Med., $75 Million Boost
For California Stem Cell Scientists: Assembly Speaker Says California
on the Path to Cures-State Now Largest Source of Funding for
available at
16, 2007),
(Mar.
Stem Cell Research
Embryonic
http://www.cirm.ca.gov/PressRelease_031607.
86. See CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note 81.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
90. See CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note 80. CIRM began
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grant applications to non-profits" had 231 applicants, of
which 141 were rejected and seventy-three were
recommended for funding (the difference comprising those in
the "[riecommended if funds available" category).9 2 Pre-IP
consolidation requests for grant applications from both forprofit and non-profit entities 93-grant requests with even
more money available per grantee-netted similar (or fewer)
numbers of applicants; and a very small proportion of the
awards went to for-profit entities. For example, six out of
twenty-three awards for the Tools and Technologies grant
went to for-profits,9 4 and only two out of fifteen of the awards
for the Early Translational grant went to for-profits." One
possible reason for this discrepancy is that fewer for-profits
were applying because of concerns about CIRM's IP policies."
The for-profits' concerns are clearly related to CIRM's
revenue sharing requirement."
The private sector is
approving grants to non-profit stem cell research organizations more than two
years before it began approving grants to for-profit organizations. See CAL.
INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note 81. Eleven of the fifteen pre-IP
consolidation requests for applications were exclusive to non-profits and
academic institutions. Id. However, the number of for-profit applicants and the
difference in amounts awarded to for-profits is not proportionate to the timing
differences or the number of applications for which for-profits were eligible to
apply. Id. The differences in amounts awarded to for-profits and the number of
for-profit applicants may be linked to other factors, such as the type of grant.
See discussion infra Part IV.
91. RFA 06-01: CIRM SEED Grant, CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED.,
http://www.cirm.ca.gov/RFA_06-01 (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). This request for
applications was exclusive to non-profits. Id.
92. Summaries of Review for Applications to RFA 06-01, CAL. INST. FOR
REGENERATIVE MED., http://www.cirm.ca.gov/Summaries_RFA_06-01
(last
visited Nov. 11, 2010). There were no grants offered exclusively to for-profits
before IP consolidation. See CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note
Unfortunately there is no pre-IP consolidation request for grant
81.
applications to non-profits exclusively that is comparable to a pre-IP
consolidation request to both for-profit and non-profit entities. Id.
93. So far, there have been no grants offered exclusively to for-profits. See
CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note 81.

94. Press Release, Cal. Inst. for Regenerative Med., CIRM Announces Tools
and Technologies Grants to Remove Obstacles on the Path to Therapies (Dec.
10, 2008), available at http1/www.cirm.ca.gov/PressRelease_121008.
95. See Press Release, Cal. Inst. for Regenerative Med., supra note 33.
96. The exact breakdown of applicants by non-profit or for-profit status is
unavailable; therefore, the best approximation of the proportion of each type of
applicantis the number of approved applications.
97. See Email from Julie McDonnell, Vice President Legal Affairs, iPierian,
Inc. to author (Jan. 15, 2010, 12:29 PST) (on file with author) ("[iPierian] see[s]
[CIRM's loan program] as a better source of funds for a small biotech than the
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comprised of for-profits with an overriding motivation of
revenue. For-profits are wary of CIRM's policy for good
reason: a ten-million dollar grant from CIRM to a for-profit
previously could, and can still, result in a $135 million
payment to the State."
That is the kind of return on capital, and the kind of broad
claim to downstream revenues, that a venture capitalist
would be happy to see. It represents the "true cost of
funds" to potential grantees and their investors, and they
will weigh

this cost when they assess

the grant

opportunity.99
From the number of for-profit grantees under the former IP
policy, it seems apparent that most for-profits weighed the
true cost of funds and decided that the possible cost of future
revenue sharing outweighed the near-term benefit of grant
money. The former IP policy was therefore discouraging forprofit participation.
D. Consolidationof CIRM's IP Policy
The ICOC, at its September 25, 2008 Board meeting,
approved a project that (a) consolidated the intellectual
property regulations for Non-Profit Grantees and For-Profit
Grantees into a single set of regulations, and (b) clarified the
scope of certain regulations.'00 The Intellectual Property
Task Force ("IPTF"), tasked with drafting the revisions,
stated that the intention behind the regulatory revisions was
to merge the IP regulations for the non-profit sector with
those for the for-profit sector.' 0 ' Apart from the revenue

grants which do affect intellectual property and future revenues.").
98. See, e.g., supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (explaining how a
$10 million grant could result in a $135 million payback).
99. Owen C.B. Hughes et al., United States Regulation of Stem Cell
Research: Recasting Government's Role and Questions to Be Resolved, 37
HOFSTRA L. REV. 383, 431-32 (2008).
100. See Memorandum from C. Scott Tocher to Members of the Indep.
Citizens' Oversight Comm., supra note 24. The ICOC tasked the Intellectual
Property Task Force (IPTF) with drafting the revisions to the regulations and
initiating the formal adoption process with the Office of Administrative Law.
Id.
101. Edward E. Penhoet, Committee Chairman, Remarks at the Regular
Meeting of the Intell. Prop. Task Force of the Indep. Citizens' Oversight Comm.
to the Cal. Inst. for Regenerative Med. (Nov. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.cirm.ca.gov/files/transcripts/pdf/2008/11-18-08.pdf.
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sharing provisions, the two policies were very similar.'0 2 The
IPTF also noted that there were some features of the former
IP policy that might actually discourage collaboration,
especially between groups that are CIRM-funded and those
that are not. 0 3
The ambiguities in the former policy needed to be
addressed-specifically, whether or not collaborators were
obligated to buy into CIRM's intellectual property policies.104
The circumstances that obligated for-profit collaborators to
follow CIRM's IP policies were unclear. 0 s As Chairman
Penhoet put it, "there was a notion floating around ... that
anybody who touched anything related to CIRM was going to
be . . . drawn under the [CIRM IP] tent."'0 6 For example, it
was unclear whether collaboration in the form of a nonCIRM-funded supplier of a stem cell and a CIRM-funded
researcher who was going to use that cell would result in
subjection of the supplier to the CIRM IP regulations.0 7
The confusion regarding when or whether a collaborator
became subject to CIRM's IP policy was likely aggravated by
CIRM's Disease Team Initiative, an effort to foster
collaboration between non-profits and for-profits.'o
The
grants stemming from the initiative supported teams
composed of basic, translational and clinical scientists
and
to
develop therapies
working
synergistically
diagnostics.'
For example, the Disease Team Research
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
Exacerbating the problem is the fact that oftentimes
sublicensing goes hand-in-hand with early stage inventions. See Elona Baum,
General Counsel, Remarks at the Regular Meeting of the Indep. Citizens'
Oversight Committee to the Cal. Inst. for Regenerative Med. (Aug. 20, 2009),
available at http://www.cirm.ca.gov/files/transcripts/pdf/2009/8-20-09.pdf.
The
sublicenses are packaged and embedded along the research pipeline, and
eventually are embedded within a drug. Id.
106. Penhoet, supra note 101.
107. See id.
108. See RFA 07-04: CIRM Disease Team PlanningAwards, CAL. INST. FOR
REGENERATIVE MED., http://www.cirm.ca.gov/RFA_07-04 (last visited Nov. 11,
2010).
109. Id. "The Disease Team Research Awards include approximately $8
million from the Medical Research Council, UK, and approximately $35 million
from the Cancer Stem Cell Consortium, Canada, to fund the international
portions of the collaborations." Press Release, Cal. Inst. for Regenerative Med.,
The UK and Canada Award More than $250 Million to Accelerate the Pace of
Bringing Stem Cell Therapies to the Clinic (Oct. 28, 2009), available at
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Awards ("Disease Team Grant") were granted in 2009 to
move experimental stem cell treatments into an
investigational new-drug filing with the US Food and Drug
Administration.11 0 Despite the substantial grant money at
stake, the number of applicants for this grant was very small
compared to previous grants.1"' iZumi, for example, declined
to co-apply for a Disease Team Grant with The Parkinson's
Institute because of uncertainty about CIRM's IP policy." 2
The failure of iZumi to collaborate with The Parkinson's
Institute is significant in light of who was involved, and it is
illustrative of the chilling effect. In July 2009, iZumi merged
with Pierian to form iPierian."' A month later, in August
2009, iPierian sent a public comment to the ICOC detailing
its concerns about definitions in the revenue sharing
provision."' Earlier that year, iPierian had announced a
formal collaboration with Dr. Yamanaka-perhaps the most
important person in the stem cells field-to develop and
improve methods of deriving induced pluripotent stem ("iPS")
cells."' Yet, iPierian was afraid to take State money
designed to facilitate just such a collaboration. If a company
working with Dr. Yamanaka, the godfather of iPS cells, was
reluctant to collaborate with a non-profit on a CIRM grant for
fear of subjection to CIRM's IP policy, then the chilling effect
must be very real indeed.'
The uncertainty regarding the IP policy likely had to do
http://www.cirm.ca.gov/PressRelease_102809.
Grants
California Stem-cell
Hayden,
Check
Erika
110. See
at
available
(2009),
22
22,
NATURE
462
Awarded,
the
(describing
http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091102/pdf/462022a.pdf
significant research the grants are producing, for example developing
monoclonal antibodies to target cancer cells). Preclinical data suggests that
many stem cell therapies are ready for translation from research to clinical
therapies. See CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note 20.
111. See Summaries of Review for Applicants to RFA 09-01, CAL. INST. FOR
(last
REGENERATIVE MED., http://www.cirm.ca.gov/SummariesRFA-09-01
visited Nov. 11, 2010). CIRM awarded more than $250 million to fourteen
multidisciplinary teams of researchers in October, 2009. Press Release, Cal.
Inst. for Regenerative Med., supra note 109.
112. Interview with Bill Langston, supra note 5.
113. See Press Release, iPierian, supra note 1.
114. Email from Julie McDonnell, Vice President Legal Affairs, iPierian, Inc.,
to Indep. Citizens' Oversight Comm. (Aug. 18, 2009, 17:27:37 PST), available at
http://www.cirm.ca.gov/files/meetings/pdfl2009/091509_item_3_CommentB.pdf
(detailing her concerns regarding the ambiguity of certain definitions).
115. Interview with Bill Langston, supra note 5.
116. See id.
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with the scope of the access and revenue sharing
requirements.117 Most of CIRM's former IP obligations were
triggered by licensing-based transactions under the old IP
policy."s Take, as an example, revenue sharing. For the
purposes of revenue sharing, the former IP policy divided forprofits into two groups: those that licensed CIRM funded
patents, and those that commercialized products resulting
from CIRM funded research. The former IP policy did not
address the myriad of other ways that value in intellectual
property derived from CIRM funded research could be
transferred-for example, by sales or assignments."' Given
the widespread confusion these gaps in the former IP policy
caused, the proposed consolidating regulations were meant to
make clear that, regardless of the format of transfer, the
intellectual property derived from CIRM funded research fell
within CIRM's IP provisions, including the access and
revenue sharing requirements. 2 0
In summary, CIRM's consolidated regulations were
meant to 1) clarify how the regulations will operate in a
collaborative setting; and 2) clarify the reach of the IP
regulations to better illuminate what happens when nongrantees or non-licensees use or benefit from CIRM-funded

intellectual property.121
III. PROBLEMS WITH CIRM's CONSOLIDATED IP POLICY

The consolidated IP regulations make subtle, yet
significant, changes to the revenue sharing policy for forprofit entities. To private companies applying for CIRM
funding-individually or in collaboration with non-profitsthe old IP policy was anathema.122 It was unclear and it
discouraged a growing segment of important research by
introducing potential disincentives to private industry
participation. For-profits could not be sure of the scope of
117. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 100607-100608 (2009).
118. See Nancy Koch, Counsel, Remarks at the Regular Meeting of the
Intell. Prop. Task Force of the Indep. Citizens' Oversight Comm. to
the Cal. Inst. for Regenerative Med. (Nov. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.cirm.ca.gov/files/transcripts/pdfl2008/11-18-08.pdf.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Memorandum from C. Scott Tocher to Members of the Indep.
Citizens' Oversight Comm., supra note 24.
122. Interview with Bill Langston, supra note 5.
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CIRM's IP reach, and therefore did not know what would
subject them to the revenue sharing policy. iPierian, for
example, declined to collaborate on a grant for fear of being
subject to CIRM's IP policy.123 The lack of participation by
for-profits contributed to the chilling effect.
For CIRM to accomplish its stated goals and provide
financial benefit to the State, it is imperative that the
consolidated IP policy provides not only clarification, but an
incentive to participate, thereby promoting translation and
mitigating the chilling effect. The ICOC can achieve these
goals by creating a "revenue sharing option" that would put
partial control of how much revenue a for-profit shares with
the State in its own hands.
IV. ANALYSIS OF CIRM'S CONSOLIDATED IP POLICY

The goals of CIRM are to promote stem cell research and
To do this, it
to create collateral economic benefit.' 24
encourages collaboration as a means to commercialize
scientific discoveries. Collaboration requires participation by
for-profits, but CIRM's access and revenue sharing
requirements discourage for-profit participation. In fact, the
primary anti-revenue sharing argument is that revenue
sharing will have a chilling effect on the commercialization of
scientific discoveries.
The consolidated IP policy makes the access and revenue
sharing provisions more onerous, and will exacerbate the
chilling effect. To illustrate the effect of CIRM's consolidated
IP policy, Part A of this section discusses the effect of
consolidation on the scope of CIRM's IP regulations in light of
new definitions; 2 5 Part B explores the chilling effect that
changes to the revenue sharing provisions have caused by
further discouraging for-profit participation;'2 6 and Part C
analyzes the clarifications made to the IP policy.'27
A. The Scope of CIRM's Access Provisions
New and revised definitions in the consolidated IP policy
These
broaden the scope of CIRM's regulatory reach.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
See
See
See
See

Proposition 71, supra note 11, at 1.
discussion infra Part IV.A.
discussion infra Part IV.B.
discussion infra Part IV.C.
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definitions will intensify the chilling effect by placing access
requirements on inventions and technologies that use any
CIRM funded research, making them more difficult to move
in the marketplace.
The new and revised definitions will impose additional
encumbrances on CIRM-funded products and expand the
scope of technologies and inventions to which CIRM can trace
its contribution.1 28 These new definitions affect the access
plan in the consolidated IP policy, set out at section
100607(a).1 29 The access plan requires a grantee, collaborator
or exclusive licensee that is commercializing any drug
resulting from CIRM-Funded Research to submit a plan
before commercialization to afford uninsured Californians
access to the drug, provide the drug, and charge no more than
"any benchmark price" described in the Program (if the drug
is purchased under the Program with California State
funds)."1o

First, CIRM's consolidated policy adds the definition of
"exclusive licensee," a definition that is purposely broad
enough to increase "reach through."'' Reach through allows
the funder-in this case CIRM-to require that access be
provided to developments that the recipient makes with the
Reach through provisions are considered
funds.'"'
undesirable by many recipients because they can burden all
the developments created after the use of the material.'
At one time, the definition of "exclusive licensee" under
consideration for the consolidated IP policy included language
that required an exclusive license to be received "'directly'
from a Grantee, Grantee Personnel or Collaborator."'3 4 Dr.
Penhoet, Chairman of the IP Task Force, in speaking about
the "exclusive licensee" term, stated that the obligation

128. See generally Hughes et al., supra note 99, at 433.
129. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100607(a) (2009).
130. § 100607(a)-(g). This is essentially the same as the former policy
because it requires the provision of the drug to those who cannot afford it.
131. See Penhoet, supra note 101.
132. See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L INSTS. OF
HEALTH, WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS, U.S., DEFINITIONS
RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER app. B (1998), available at
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/appendb.htm.
133. Id.
134. See Memorandum from C. Scott Tocher to Members of the Indep.
Citizens' Oversight Comm., supra note 24.
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should follow the technology to the marketplace; 135 yet the
language in the IP provisions under consideration would have
allowed the pharmaceutical company at the end of the
development chain to avoid those provisions.
This
circumvention was contrary to the intent of the IP
taskforce.' 36 It was explicitly the IPTF's intent to include
downstream parties in these provisions by eliminating the
phrase "'directly' from a Grantee, Grantee personnel or
Collaborator."13 7
Because the access provision is an encumbrance, this
expanded definition will hinder the movement of exclusivelylicensed CIRM-Funded Research, further chilling the
marketplace.
In order to ensure that translation is
successful-which can take up to fifteen years, hundreds of
millions of dollars, and access to thousands of tools, reagents,
and other resources-a product must be kept free of
encumbrances. 3 1
Revenue sharing is the simplest
encumbrance, but the access plan requirements that
accompany CIRM funds, are an even more onerous
encumbrance. 3 9 The access provision in CIRM's IP policy is
part of the marketplace's calculus when it tries to price any
technology or product offered by a CIRM grantee.'40 If the
terms are not easily priced, then the affected property may be
slow or impossible to trade.14 ' Stanford University, for its
part, stated that it has not been able to license twelve or
135. See Penhoet, supra note 101.
136. Id.
137. Elona Baum, General Counsel, Remarks at the Regular Meeting of the
Indep. Citizens' Oversight Committee to the Cal. Inst. for Regenerative Med.
(Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.cirm.ca.gov/files/transcripts/pdfl2009/915-09.pdf. Ambiguities surrounding this issue were discussed in the ICOC's
regular meeting on Sept. 15, 2009. Id. James Harrison, Board Counsel, stated
that the guiding principle of regulatory construction is to give intent to the
language. See James Harrison, Board Counsel, Remarks at the Regular
Meeting of the Intell. Prop. Task Force of the Indep. Citizens' Oversight Comm.
to the Cal. Inst. for Regenerative Med. (Sept. 15, 2009), available at
If there is
http://www.cirm.ca.gov/files/transcripts/pdfl2009/9-15-09.pdf.
ambiguity, one looks to evidence of the agency's intent, which he stated was
clear, despite the potential ambiguity in the reading of the language. Id.
138. Hughes et al., supra note 99, at 433.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 429.
141. Id. Some of CIRM's policy terms are written in language with which the
market is familiar, such as royalty rates, encouraging increased participation.
Id. To date, CIRM has approved 328 grants totaling more than one billion
dollars. See CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note 80.
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thirteen patents because of concerns about the access and
pricing requirements.' 4 2 The access provision encumbrance
will now follow exclusively-licensed CIRM-Funded Research
all the way downstream, further chilling the marketplace.
Second, the definitions of "CIRM-Funded Technology"
and "CIRM-Funded Invention" broaden the scope of the
consolidated IP policy by expanding the technologies and
inventions to which CIRM can trace its contribution.
According to Hughes and his co-authors, "[b]iopharmaceutical
product development relies on many research tools and
ancillary technologies that contribute to, but do not comprise,
the [final] product."" In addition to their potential to aid in
the development of stem cell therapies, these contributory
materials are expected to lead to the development of "classic"
drugs.'4 4 Under the consolidated IP policy, the possibility
that developers of these "classic" drugs who seek exclusive
licenses will fall under the access plan,'4 5 has become a
certainty: if a developer of such drugs seeks an exclusive
license to use research tools derived in any way from work
funded by CIRM, it will face section 100607's access
requirements.
The reason these developers will face access
requirements is that the definition of exclusive licensee now
"CIRM-Funded
definitions:
new
two
incorporates
Technology,"' 46 and "CIRM-Funded Invention." 47 Both the
technology and inventions covered by the definitions must
have been paid for in whole or in part by CIRM funds."
"CIRM-Funded Technology" includes "[dlata, materials,
research results or know-how whether patentable or not, that
is generated or conceived in the Project Period."'4 9 "CIRMFunded Invention[s]" include any "[i]nvention, whether
patentable or not, which arises from CIRM-Funded
Research."5 o
142. See Baum, supra note 105.
143. Hughes et al., supra note 99, at 435.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100601(f) (2009).
147. § 100601(c).
148. § 100601(c), (f).
149. § 100601(f). The term "Project Period" is defined as "[tihe amount of
time over which CIRM funds a specific Grant." § 100601(bb).
150. § 100601(c). The term "CIRM-Funded Research" specifically refers to
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These expanded definitions manifest the tracing problem
and they will further chill the marketplace. The ability to
link research funding to results is known as "the 'tracing'
problem that faces all licensors and licensees who seek to
establish a rational (and empirically ascertainable)
connection between what is licensed and what is sold." 51
CIRM has exacerbated the problem for exclusive licensees by
broadening the scope of what it can trace. Formerly, CIRM
could trace its contribution to any products "resulting"
(whether patents emerged or not) from "research" to which
CIRM had contributed anything at all.152 CIRM can now
trace its contribution not only on products that would infringe
a patented invention resulting from the CIRM-funded work,
but also on any technology "generated" or even "conceived"
during the project period and paid for in whole or in part by
CIRM funds; whether or not a patent emerges.15 3
It is unsurprising that the University of California has
expressed concern.15 The increased "reach through" caused
by the broadened definition of "exclusive licensee" will likely
stymie translation further. Dr. Penhoet even went so far as
to state that this "will be a barrier to licensing from time to
time," and if it "turns out to be a significant barrier to seeing
our technology come to fruition," then the issue should be
revisited in the future.'5 ' Now any exclusive licensee will
need to ask itself whether any of the licensed subject matter
"[a]ll aspects of work conducted on a CIRM-Funded Project or Activity that is
paid for, in whole or in part, with CIRM funds." § 100601(e).
151. Hughes et al., supra note 99, at 432.
152. Id. ("A licensee in an ordinary commercial negotiation would reject or
strongly resist such a formulation. Here it is mandatory.").
153. Compare id., with § 100601(f).
154. See Scott Tocher, ITPF Counsel to the Chair, Cal. Inst. for Regenerative
Med., Remarks at the Regular Meeting of the Indep. Citizens' Oversight Comm.
(Aug. 20, 2009), availableat http://www.cirm.ca.gov/files/transcripts/pdf/2009/820-09.pdf. The definition of the "CIRM-Funded Inventions" gravely concerned
the University of California, in particular, because of its potential impact on
researchers who do not have the benefit of receiving CIRM funds directly
Id.
Unlike CIRM-funded researchers, those unrelated
or indirectly.
researchers are not even aware of the impact CIRM funding may have
on their research results, and they do not have the opportunity to decline the
CIRM funds if they choose not to incur CIRM obligations.
Jeff Hall,
Univ. of Cal. System-wide Office of the President: Research and Graduate
Studies, Cal. Inst. for Regenerative Med., Remarks at the Regular Meeting
of the Indep. Citizens' Oversight Comm. (Aug. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.cirm.ca.gov/files/transcripts/pdf/2009/8-20-09.pdf.
155. Penhoet, supra note 21.
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was funded, even partially, by CIRM.'5 s Furthermore, it does
not appear to matter how directly or materially the tool or
technique contributed to the product's design, development,
or success. 157
Finally, the definition of "CIRM-Funded Research,"
incorporated into the access plan broadens the scope of the
plan, and, therefore, does little to quell the skittishness of forThe definition of "Drug," while now
profit entities.'
excluding some medical procedures and services,"' is still
broad enough to include essentially any product that is, or is
incorporated into, a method to care for the health of humans
or animals. 6 0 To fall under the access plan, the drug must
still be the result of "CIRM-Funded Research," but the
definition of this term is now even broader, including "[a]11
aspects of work conducted on a CIRM-Funded Project or
Activity that is paid for, in whole or in part, with CIRM
funds."' 6 ' Anything that falls within this scope is subject to
regulatory claims that the seller must provide access and
discounts on its product. 162 These increases in the scope of
the regulatory application will make it more difficult for
companies to quantify the total cost of this access and CIRM
funded research will, therefore, be more difficult to move in
the marketplace.
B. The Chilling Effect of CIRM's ConsolidatedIP Policy
To the extent that CIRM's IP regulations are meant to
address a specific area of science and to promote the social
benefits that accompany scientific research, it is
understandable that the ICOC uses a heavier regulatory

156. Hughes et al., supra note 99, at 435.
157. Id.
158. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100601(e) (2009).
159. § 100601(i) ("Drug. (1) An article recognized in the official United States
Pharmacopoeia, Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or National
Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; (2) an article intended for use in
the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in humans
or animals; or, (3) an article intended for use as a component of any article
specified in subdivision (1) or (2). This term includes therapeutic products such
as blood, blood products and cells, but excludes medical procedures and services
relating thereto.").
160. Hughes et al., supra note 99, at 434.
161. § 100601(e).
162. Hughes et al., supra note 99, 434-35.
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touch;'s however, CIRM's ability to achieve its legislative
mandate may be hamstrung by the effects of consolidation on

revenue sharing.164
Revenue sharing means that there will be less revenue
for those subject to the provisions governing the policy."'5 In
California, that amount is at least twenty-five percent of any
net revenue over $500,000 resulting from CIRM funding,' 6
but it can become much larger than that very quickly. The
claim therefore, is that there is less incentive for each of these
actors to engage in the commercialization process, and the
marketplace will be chilled accordingly. This section will
examine the relationship between changes in the consolidated
IP policy, and the chilling effect.
1. Non-Profit GranteeParticipation
For non-profits, the consolidated IP policy does not alter
requirements significantly and, therefore, it will not affect the
robust non-profit participation CIRM has seen. The revenue
sharing provision of the consolidated policy matches almost
word for word the former non-profit revenue sharing
provision. 16
It is likely, therefore, that public sector
scientists and their parent institutions will continue to find it
difficult to decline a significant grant from CIRM (and forego
The prospect of a potential
the associated acclaim).'s
obligation to pay back a percentage of revenues if those net
revenues surpass the $500,000 mark, is a distant one
indeed. 161
It is true that many scientists appear to be motivated
more by economic gains than scientific acclaim, but it does
not follow that public sector research programs will slow
significantly because of the revenue sharing provision. 7 0
Logically, the ability to do research must be the most
important thing to public sector scientists because without
163. Id. at 423-24.
164. See generally Penhoet, supra note 21 (explaining that increased reachthrough may present a barrier to licensing).
165. See Herder, supra note 7, at 225.
166. § 100608(a)(1).
167. Compare § 100608 with § 100408.
168. Herder, supra note 7, at 225.
169. Id. The revenues must also exceed the costs incurred by the institution
during research and commercialization. Id.
170. Id.
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that ability neither revenue nor acclaim will be
forthcoming."' CIRM has seen, and continues to see, high
numbers of non-profit applicants and grantees.'72
2. CollaboratorParticipation
The consolidated IP policy has exacerbated the chilling
effect by discouraging for-profit participation, whether
individually as a grantee or in collaboration with a non-profit,

as a collaborator.173
Changes to the revenue sharing policy brought about by
the consolidated policy will aggravate the chilling effect and
discourage collaboration. First, the final royalty payment of
one percent is no longer limited to patented inventions, but
now also includes CIRM-Funded Technologies and CIRMFunded Inventions where the royalty payment lasts "20 years
after the close of the Grant.""' This manifests the same
"tracing" problem described in Part IV.A."' For the purposes
of revenue sharing, CIRM can now trace its contribution on
any data, materials, research results, or know-how resulting
from research to which CIRM has contributed anything at
all.176
This formulation gives for-profits a beacon, in effect
apprising them of the extent of the technologies CIRM can
reach: anytime a for-profit considers taking money from
CIRM it will assume that any technologies that relate to the
work funded by CIRM will result in royalty payments.17 7 This
change will depress participation, and therefore translation,
not because of for-profits' confusion due to "tracing" but
because of the clarification regarding the extent of the
technologies to which CIRM can trace its contribution. Thus,
it will serve to further chill the market.
Furthermore, whereas formerly for-profit grantees had to
share with California revenue from licensing of CIRM-funded
171. Id.
172. See CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note 81.

173. The for-profit/non-profit terminology in the former revenue sharing
provisions were done away with in favor of the terms "grantee" and
"collaborator." See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100607(a) (2009).
174. See § 100608(b)(3).
175. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
176. § 100601(f). The technology must also have been generated or conceived
during the project period. Id.
177. See Hughes et al., supra note 99, at 432.
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work agreements ("Net Licensing Revenue"), they now share
the same amount as non-profit grantees: "[Twenty-five]
percent of Licensing Revenue received in excess of
$500,000.""' In essence, the "Net" has been removed." 9 For
a for-profit grantee, licensing revenue is calculated by
subtracting some proportion of patent prosecution and
protection expenses from the "total consideration rendered."so
The old policy, on the other hand, subtracted the same
Consideration is not
expenses from "Ig]ross revenue."'
82
Presumably, gross
to
uncertainty.1
and
may
lead
defined
revenue could be construed as a much smaller amount than
total consideration rendered if, for example, the patent was
licensed for some consideration other than revenue. This
potential increase could only displease for-profits and
discourage them from taking CIRM funds.' 83
Second, the consolidated IP policy will actually
discourage collaboration with non-profits, propagating the
chilling effect. The major change in the regulations here is
that the word "collaborators" was inserted into each relevant
subsection of the provision governing revenue sharing so that
it is utterly unmistakable that collaborators are subject to the
same revenue sharing policy as individual grantees.'8 4 One of
the goals of consolidation was to encourage collaboration, but
in light of the potentially exorbitant amount of revenue that
must be shared (in the above example, 1350%),185 this
Now that for-profit
inclusion will not foster collaboration.'
collaborators are definitively subject to the revenue sharing
policy and its far reaches, they will be even less likely to
178. § 100608(a)(1).
179. See id.
180. § 100601(t).
181. § 100401(m) ("Net Licensing Revenue. Gross revenue derived from a
License Agreement minus the direct costs incurred in the prosecution and
protection of a CIRM-funded Patented Invention.") (emphasis added).
182. One of the concerns raised by iPierian during the period for comment on
consolidation was that "consideration" should be defined. Email from Julie
McDonnell to Indep. Citizens' Oversight Comm., supra note 114.
183. See id.
184. See § 100608.
185. See discussion supra notes 71 76 and accompanying text. (explaining
the possibility of $135 million dollars in revenue sharing resulting from a ten
million dollar grant).
186. The principle thrust of the consolidation, according to Chairman
Penhoet, was to reduce the barriers to collaboration. See Penhoet, supra note
101.
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collaborate, exacerbating the chilling effect." 7
In fact, it is possible to roughly determine the effect of
the consolidated IP policy on the number of for-profit
applicants using regression analysis.' 8 The participation
numbers discussed in Part B give a simplistic view, in that
they take into account only the nature of the applicant.
Despite the small number of grants awarded by CIRM,s 9
something more significant may be said about the variability
of the number of applicants using a procedure called multiple
regression.190 Just as price affects sales in a commercial
context, revenue sharing and access requirements may affect
the number of grant applicants in a research funding
context.' 9 ' But revenue sharing and access requirements are
not the only explanatory variables. Other factors that may
strongly affect demand for grants from CIRM are: the type of
grant;19 2 which entities are eligible to apply for the grant (i.e.,
non-profits vs. non-profits and for-profits); 9 3 and whether the
applicant believed the consolidated IP policy would apply to
its grant or not.194
A multiple regression equation can be estimated using
the aforementioned factors."' The factors that turn out to be
most significant are listed in the following table:' 96
187. See § 100608.
188. WILLIAM F. SAMUELSON & STEPHEN G. MARKS, MANAGERIAL
ECONOMICS 128 (6th ed. 2009) ("Regression analysis is a set of statistical

techniques using past observations to find (or estimate) the equation that best
summarizes the relationship among key economic variables.").
189. CIRM grants have been awarded in seventeen rounds of funding as of
June 15, 2010. See CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note 81.
190. See Samuelson, supra note 188, at 133-35.
191. Id.
192. See CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note 81 (listing different
grant types).
193. Id. Of the seventeen CIRM Requests for Applications, ten have been
exclusive to non-profits and academic institutions. Id.
194. Id. Applicants to the Disease Team Research Awards (10/28/09), Basic
Biology 11 (04/29/10), and Research Leadership (04/29/10) believed that the
consolidated IP policy either possibly or definitely applied to their grants. Id.
The ordinary least squares
195. Samuelson, supra note 188, at 134.
regression method computes the coefficients for each of the explanatory
variables entered, and the objective is to find the coefficients that will minimize
the standard squared error. Id. The regression equation used to explain the
variation in number of applicants for CIRM grants is: yf = 55.5 + 210 (SEED) +
49 (Comprehensive) + 30 (New Faculty) + 62.6 (Tools and Technologies) - 16
(New IP Possibly/Definitely Apply) - 34.5 (Non-Profit/Academic Only). See id.
196. Using Microsoft's Excel spreadsheet program, dummy variables can be
created for the factors effecting demand and entered in individual columns. See
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Factor

Applicants

Intercept
SEED
Comprehensive
New Faculty
Tools and Technologies
Consolidated IP Policy Possibly or
Definitely Applies
Non-Profit/Academic Only

55.5
210
49
30
62.5
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-16
-34.5

The values in the right hand column represent a change
in the number of applicants due solely to the factor in the left
hand column, when all other factors are held constant. For
example, the change in the number of grant applications due
solely to the grant type being a SEED grant is 210-i.e.,
CIRM saw an increase of 210 applicants when the grant type
was a SEED grant.'e The most significant coefficient, with
respect to the focus of this paper, is the one labeled
"Consolidated IP Policy Possibly or Definitely Applies" ("IP
Policy Coefficient"). What this coefficient means is that, if the
request for applications came at a time when grant applicants
either thought or knew that the consolidated intellectual
property policy would apply to research funded by their
grants, grant applications decreased from the intercept by
sixteen."' In effect, the IP Policy Coefficient is the only legal
Because IP
factor affecting the number of applicants.
consolidation will not affect non-profit participation, this
variability in applicants is likely due to reluctance on the part
of for-profits to participate for fear of being subjected to the
new IP policy.
The chilling effect will be enhanced by the changes
effected by the consolidation because collaborators now know
they are subject to the policy. Consequently, it will be harder
for grantees and collaborators to resist CIRM's claim to a
id. at 173. "The regression program recognizes each column of data as a
separate explanatory variable." Id. Running the regression produces output in
a table. See id.
197. The 210 applicant increase is actually an increase of 210 above the
intercept.
198. Notably, when the grant was open to non-profits and academic
institutions only-i.e. the grant excluded for-profits-applicants dropped by
34.5 below the intercept, everything else being constant.
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portion of its revenues, and grantees and collaborators will
potentially owe more money when licensing."' The chill of
these effects on for-profits will spread to non-profits that
increasingly depend on for-profits to shoulder some of the
burden and provide cachet when applying for grants in
"disease teams."20 0 Without these "teams," valuable research
will not be conducted, economic benefits will be lost, and the
chilling effect will further freeze the marketplace.20 1
C. Clarificationof CIRM's IP Regulations
While CIRM's consolidated IP policy has and will
continue to exacerbate the chilling effect, the consolidated
policy does much to clarify the obligations of grantees and
collaborators by simplifying the regulations, adding necessary
provisions, and addressing discrepancies. First, CIRM has
clarified its IP policies by simplifying the process of sharing
net commercial revenues with the State of California. Under
the former policy, the for-profit grantee was required to pay
California a negotiated royalty between two and five
percent.2 02 This negotiation process was replaced with a flat
three percent royalty based on net commercial revenue,2 03
making it clearer to potential grantees what they might owe
the State.2 04
Second, the consolidated IP policy fills in the blanks of its
predecessor. One of the purposes of the consolidation was to
clarify the reach of IP regulations with regard to nongrantees or non-licensees benefiting from CIRM funded IP.205
Section 100611 does this by describing "Third-Party
Compliance," a description that the original IP policy did not
include.2 06 This section addresses the responsibilities of an
entity that becomes a successor in interest, other than by
license, of CIRM-funded IP by virtue of a merger, purchase,
or other means-for instance, when one entity acquires
another.20 7 Upon acquisition, the acquiring entity assumes all
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
Interview with Bill Langston, supra note 5.
See id.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100408(b)(1) (2009).
§ 100608(b)(1).
See id.
See Penhoet, supra note 101.
See § 100611.
Id. See also Memorandum from C. Scott Tocher to Members of the
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of the same obligations of the acquired grantee or
collaborator.2 08
Third, CIRM's consolidated policy addresses some of the
glaring discrepancies that existed in the old policy. California
still ratably reduces its share if parties other than CIRM are
involved in the funded work; 209 but under the old policy,
proration was expressed differently in different places.2 10
Language outlining the scope of proration under 100402(c)
described it as "all other sources of funding that contributed
in whole or in part to the discovery of the CIRM-funded
invention." 21 1 The for-profit grantee was required to report
the percentage of the various funding sources when it filed its
patent application.2 12 However, section 100408(a)(2) used the
word "development" instead of "discovery." 213 "'Discovery' is
not 'development,' and in fact the latter is likely to continue
well beyond the date when a patent application is filed.214
This discrepancy may produce serious disagreements over
what kind of proration is permitted to for-profit grantees in

practice." 215
The consolidated policy does away with the non-profit
grantee language-funds "used in the creation of' the
relevant patented invention 21 6-and replaces it with the forprofit language.21 7 The consolidated policy also adds the word
"directly" so that whenever such funds "directly contributed
to the development of' the invention they may be ratably
reduced.2 18 Section 100602 in the consolidated policy uses the
same language, so this discrepancy no longer exists and
applicants can feel more confident in the amount of proration
they can expect to see."' Thus, the consolidated policy does
Indep. Citizens' Oversight Comm., supra note 24.
208. See § 100611.
209. See § 100608(a)(2).
210. Compare § 100402(c) with § 100408(a)(2).
211. § 100402(c).
212. Id.
213. § 100408(a)(2).
214. Hughes et al., supra note 99, at 431 n.226.
215. Id.
216. § 100308(c).
217. "If funding sources other than CIRM (including those of the
Grantee .. .) directly contributed to the development of said CIRM-Funded
Invention. . . ." § 10 0 608(a)(2).
218. Id.
219. § 100602.
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clarify some obligations, but the effects of these clarifications
will likely be overwhelmed by more significant changes to the
access and revenue sharing requirements.2 2 0
V. PROPOSING THE ADOPTION OF A BIFURCATED IP POLICY

Given the chilling effect CIRM's IP policies will have on
translation, and the increase in the chilling effect that its
consolidated policy will likely cause, CIRM should create a
bifurcated IP policy. This policy should have provisions
specific to "disease teams," and it should include a revenue
sharing option that would address all of the shortcomings of
the current policy.
While the consolidated IP policy provided much needed
clarification, it will not succeed in creating jobs and
benefitting the State economically-two of CIRM's main
objectives.22 1 Rather, the consolidated policy will further
discourage the participation of grantee and collaborator forprofits because of the greater economic burden the policy
places on these participants.2 2 2
Some critics have suggested doing away with CIRM's
revenue sharing policies completely, pointing out that returns
on revenue sharing are too small to justify the added burdens
on research and industry.22 3 These arguments, however,
preceded California's record job losses and the recent budget
crisis.224 In the current economic climate, every penny counts
and no form of potential economic benefit can be ignored.
Given the current budget crisis, the ICOC should develop a
new revenue sharing policy for disease teams that would, in
effect, mirror the hybrid nature of its applicants by applying
the attractive principles of stock-options to the revenue
sharing provisions,22 without altering the fundamental
220. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1-2.
221. OFFICE OF ADMIN. LAW, supra note 8, at 2. See discussion supra Part
IV.B.2.
222. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
223. See, e.g., Tolley, supra note 37, at 233-237.
224. See Samuels, supra note 13.
225. JAMIE PRATT, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING IN AN ECONOMIC CONTEXT 529
(7th ed. 2009) ("Many corporate executives in the United States are
compensated with stock options. These arrangements give executives an option
to purchase company stock at a given price (e.g., $10/share) for a given period of
time (e.g., 5 years). If the price of the stock increases during that time period
(e.g., $15/share), the executive benefits by purchasing the stock at $10/share
and then immediately selling it for $15/share. . . . If the stock price decreases,
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nature of the grant. The new mechanism could be called a
"revenue sharing option."
Californians have never been averse to risk;226 indeed,
they are known for their trailblazing spirit.227 This is why the
proposed policy is feasible. Stock options are high-powered
incentives that align employees' interests with shareholders'
interests and attract and retain scarce managerial and
employee talent.22 8 Stock options achieve this goal by putting
the earning power in the hands of the executives.
Given the success of using stock options to attract
talented employees, it may be possible to entice for-profit
companies to collaborate with non-profit companies using the
same method. The stock option model as applied to the CIRM
policy would similarly change the incentives associated with
research collaboration.
Stock options are used to goad
company executives to optimize their company's performance
to boost the market price of the company's stock, in turn
putting more money into the executives' pockets. Similarly,
the stock option model as applied to the research
collaboration context incentivizes the for-profit company to
make the most effective treatment possible. This would
create the most benefit to California, and would potentially
save the company money by decreasing the amount of
payments to the State.
The revenue sharing option would entice for-profits to
collaborate by giving them the option to share a lesser
amount of revenue with the State. This lesser amount would
be based on the estimated benefit that the treatment or drug

the executive simply chooses not to exercise the option. This . . . creates a
financial incentive for executives to increase the stock prices, which is
consistent with shareholder goals, and requires no cash payment from the
corporation.").
226. Michael Grunwald, Why Californiais Still America's Future, TIME, Oct.
23, 2009, at 55 ("Its voters approved huge bonds for stem-cell research, highspeed rail and repairs to aging infrastructure while Washington was dragging
its feet; its politicians adopted first-in-the-nation greenhouse-gas regulations,
green building codes and efficiency standards for automobiles and appliances
that have rearranged the national energy debate.").
227. Id. ("It's also an unparalleled engine of innovation, the mecca of high
tech, biotech and now clean tech.. .. California stands for change, for disruption
of the status quo.").
228. Armstrong et al., Stock Options and Chief Officer Compensation 1, (Rock
Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/researchlmath/papers/1447.pdf.
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would provide to the shareholders-or taxpayers in this case.
The more effective the treatment in reducing health care
costs, etc., the less revenue the company must share with the
State. In other words, the payback to the State would be
decreased in proportion to the amount of estimated economic
benefit the product or treatment produces for California.
If the option were a five-year option, with the option
period starting on commercialization of the product, then the
benefit to the State will be calculable by the time the
company decides whether or not to exercise the option. A
designated State office, at the end of the option period, would
automatically determine this estimated amount. If the
product is determined to have provided the State with a
considerable amount of benefit, the company exercises its
option and saves money hand over fist; if it does not, the
option is not exercised, and the company owes the standard
amount. There is no drawback to exercising the option.
Giving for-profit grantees such an option has the additional
benefit of incentivizing the company to create the most
effective product possible.
Although administrative and overhead costs could be
seen as a detractor to this policy, in October 2009, a
subcommittee of the directors of the California stem cell
agency approved a $300,000 economic impact study of the
agency's work in terms of job creation, advances in the
biotechnology industry, savings in patient care costs, and
increases in patient productivity.22 9 The study will develop a
model to discern the economic effects of CIRM funding on a
single disease, and that model will eventually be developed
and expanded to analyze other diseases.2 30 When the study is
229. CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDYREQUEST TO GOVERNANCE SUB-COMMITTEE FOR CONTRACT APPROVAL (2009),
available at http://www.cirm.ca.gov/files/meetings/pdf/2009/100609_item-3.pdf
("The plan agreed upon between CIRM and LECG is to initially build a model
around a test case, a specific disease-Polycythemia Vera-that is the target of
a clinical trial .

. ..

230. Id.
The model will take into account direct benefits of CIRM funding (job
creation through research and facilities awards), secondary cascades of
CIRM funding ("multiplier effect"-e.g. payments to suppliers and
subcontractors along with affiliated job creation and state revenues
from income, sales and property taxes), potential savings in health care
costs (compared to current therapies) and increased productivity for
both patients and their caretakers (related to improved vitality and
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finished, CIRM will have a fully developed case study
showing the broad-reaching economic impact resulting from
research investments that have led to a new treatment for
this disease.23 1 The groundwork, therefore, has already been
laid, and the cost to repeat the process will be less than it was
the first time around. 2
Litigation could be another
concern-for example if a company disputes the amount of
revenue reduction calculated-but part of the option would
include an agreement to arbitrate, or some other form of
alternative dispute resolution.
Offering prospective for-profit grantees this option should
be sufficient to induce them to participate in the program
instead of seeking money elsewhere in order to avoid being
subject to the more onerous revenue sharing and access
policies currently in place. The proportion by which revenue
sharing is reduced could also be calculated specifically to
overcome concerns about the broadened scope of the policy.
The possibility of a tremendous payoff to the company, in
terms of the revenue it would not have to pay the State, could
be designed to outweigh concerns, and thereby attract these
for-profits.
Admittedly, there is a downside to stock-options for
taxpayers,233 but in this imagined grant-incarnation, the
downside is offset. The downside to the taxpayers is similar
to the downside faced by shareholders: they must give away
value,23 4 diluting the interest of shareholders in the one
instance, and revenue to the taxpayers in the other. But, in
the case of stem cell research funding, the argument is
enervated by the fact that less revenue per grantee should be
offset by the increase in participation overall and by the fact
that the amount of revenue shared is only decreased by a
proportion of the good the product has done. In essence, the
quality of life).
Id. at 1-2.
231. Id. at 2.
232. See id. "[T]he model will be expanded and adapted for analyzing other
diseases and other applications of stem cells for treating these diseases. . . .
Further, we expect the results to identify data that CIRM should collect on an
on-going basis as part of its grants management process for use in future
economic analyses." Id.
233. PRATT, supra note 225, at 529 ("[Tihe executive enjoys great upside
potential and little downside risk.").
234. See Armstrong et. al., supra note 228, at 1.
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benefit for the CIRM funded participant, in terms of revenue,
is much less than that for the taxpayers because the
estimated benefits to the State in terms of health are
generally so much larger than those derived from payback
provisions.23 5
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment does not suggest the total abandonment of
a revenue sharing requirement. Rather, it argues that a
policy offering collaborating for-profit grantees the possibility
of reducing the amount of revenue they must share with
Increased
California would increase participation.
participation in the program would be more likely to achieve
CIRM's goal of economic benefit to the State than the current
revenue sharing framework. The revamped revenue sharing
policy would achieve that goal by giving companies a real,
tangible financial incentive, and by providing granteecompanies with a sense that they are at least in partial
By
control of how much they will owe the State.236
encouraging participation and overcoming the effects of the
broadened scope of the IP policy, CIRM could thaw the
marketplace and achieve its goal of collaboration, resulting in
translation and economic benefit to the State.2 37

235. See Tolley, supranote 37, at 236-37.
236. See discussion supra Part V.
237. One may be able to determine with certainty whether CIRM is
accomplishing its goals when the Economic Study is complete-if, that is, the
results are made public. See CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., supra note
229.

